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‘Ultimately nothing rests on authority; the final court of appeal is 
intrinsic reasonableness.’ (A. Whitehead 1929: 39) 
‘…complexity can and often does serve as an inducement rather 
than as a deterrent.’ (O.E. Williamson, 1985: 15) 
 
1. Introduction: The promise of theoretical unification
* 
A relatively new line of political-scientific literature analyzes inter-branch relations with the help of 
economic theories. Within that literature, the relation between the legislative and the executive 
branches of government is particularly salient. The main questions relate to the delegation of powers, 
the content of those powers, and the control of the executive by the legislative branch of government 
(e.g. Weingast & Moran 1983, Epstein & O’Halloran 1999, Franchino 2004). We have thereby gained 
valuable knowledge on legislative and bureaucratic politics, constitutional law, and democracy 
more generally.  
Considering that literature, this article makes the following two points:  
1.  Inter-branch relations analyses must be based on, and aim at, careful theorizing. This implies a 
choice between different theories.
1 Regarding that choice, the most promising option is the 
theory of transaction costs—not principal-agent nor incomplete contracts theory; and  
2.  Regarding the logic of political transactions cost-economising, several authors have noted that 
legislators may aim at both production cost- and transaction cost-minimization. Yet, a 
considerable degree of ambiguity persists in these conceptualisations. Section 4 shows how we 
can rectify these approaches. 
More analytically, the increasing number of scholars working in this field focus on the following 
two research questions. First, when do legislators delegate powers to the bureaucracy? This question 
can be formulated to apply to national, sub-national, or international legislators, and to the 
corresponding level of bureaucrats. We observe that in some cases legislators make policy themselves, 
while in others they delegate some responsibilities to bureaucrats. The goal is to explain that variation, 
and thereby to gain insight in constitutional law and politics, and in public policy-making.  
Second, how much discretion does delegation afford to bureaucrats? We observe that some 
bureaucrats are offered the opportunity to develop policy autonomously, while others have to cope 
with constant and pervasive political interference. The goal is to understand both variations in the 
decisions of powerful legislators to tie their own hands, and variations in the outcomes of ex post 
delegation confrontations. The link between this and the first question should be clear: when 
legislators agree to tie their own hands, and when this leads to them loosing in subsequent 
confrontations with bureaucrats, delegation is truly meaningful—and vice versa.  
The literature has been developing rather quickly. Important theoretical and empirical studies have 
been carried out in many empirical contexts, with national, international, inter-temporal, and inter-
policy variations. The foremost purpose of this paper is to offer important theoretical clarifications that 
apply to all empirical settings. These clarifications regard (a) the role of theory, (b) the important but 
                                                      
*   I acknowledge the financial support of the European Commission under its Marie Curie Programme. I thank Adrienne 
Héritier and Elia Marzal for their infallible support and their continuing encouragement. All remaining errors are mine. 
1   A companion paper discusses the theoretical and epistemological issues raised by our consistent failure to proceed on the 
basis of conscious, research-specific, and explicit choice. It argues that we have been unduly trapped in a path-dependent 
sequence that favours the initially contingent and inefficient choice of principal-agent. Another companion paper presents 
the economic theories discussed here in greater detail.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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largely unnoticed differences between various economic theories, and (c) the comparative advantage 
of transaction costs economics (‘TCE’)—though only if it is ‘true’ TCE.  
Insofar as part of the newer literature is based on TCE, it should offer a promise of unification (or 
at least dialogue) between Americanist political science (e.g. Moe 1984, Lohmann & O’Halloran 
1994, Epstein & O’Halloran 1994, 1999, Martin 1997, Huber & Shipan 2000, 2002), Europeanist 
political science (Majone 1996a, 1999, 2001, Moravcsik 1998, Franchino 2001, 2004), and perhaps 
even economics (Williamson 1990, 2000). Regarding Europeanist and Americanist political science, 
they both increasingly refer to TCE for the purpose of developing explanatory hypotheses on the 
variance of delegation of powers to, and discretion  of, bureaucrats across policies. The  resulting 
independent variables include (1) political expediency that benefits re-election minded politicians, (2) 
divided government and its ramifications, (3) decision rules in the legislature, (4) the technicality of a 
policy area, and (5) demand for credible commitments. (Some of these variables are sometimes 
presented separately and sometimes in a causal chain.) The dialogue between political science and 
economics represents a more elusive goal. Although the prospects for sustained inter-disciplinary 
dialogue look good, the Holy Grail of unification is still out of reach. Even within political science, 
unification is conditional on the clarification and classification of many conditions. This article is a 
first attempt to achieve this.  
Section 2 argues for a return to careful theorizing. Most political scientists concentrate on empirical 
tests of previously developed hypotheses. Yet, we would greatly benefit from re-allocating our limited 
resources to more careful theorizing. Section 3 argues in favour of pursuing work in the TCE tradition. 
It first shows that inter-branch scholarship has referred to at least three distinct economic theories 
(often confusing them): principal-agent (‘PA’), TCE, and incomplete contracts theory (‘ICT’). It then 
argues that TCE is both sufficient and necessary as a theoretical informant to our endeavours, while 
the other two theories are not. Section 4 argues that existing works on transaction cost politics have 
made important contributions, but also that they are based on several problematic or outright false 
premises. On the positive side, it lists the minimum set of elements for a consistent theory of transaction 
cost politics. Section 5 offers some additional conceptual and methodological thoughts and concludes. 
2. The place of theory in political science  
The central question addressed in this article regards the choice of a theory among a menu of 
competing economic theories. But a preliminary question is, Why bother about theoretical details, and 
not let the data sort out the theory?  
2.1. Limited resources and the choice between theory and method 
Some influential scholars have contributed to downplaying the role of theory, arguing instead the 
primacy of method. For King, Keohane & Verba, ‘we cannot develop a theory without knowledge of 
prior work on the subject and the collection of some data, since even the research questions would be 
unknown’ (1994: 19). Thus, ‘the content is the method … The content of ‘science’ is primarily the 
methods and rules, not the subject matter, since we can use these methods to study virtually anything.’ (9) 
Some classic contributions [Lijphart (1971), Friedman (1953)], offer similar views. The most 
radical positivist view is that of Friedman: ‘Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found 
to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, 
the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions…’ (1953: 14; see also 19-20). 
Inasmuch as these authors prioritize the quantitative logic of inference, their argument implies that 
researchers with limited resources should opt for method, at the expense of theory.  
A different view is that theory should take precedence over method. In that view, theory should be 
acknowledged as the most important element of (social) scientific inquiry. We start by framing a Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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research question in terms of a theory, and (ideally, but not necessarily) we finish with a generalisable 
argument that is a contribution to theory (Coase 1994: 16-17, Scharpf 1997: 22-34, Elster 1998, 
Johnson 2002). For example, Coase responded to Friedman’s view that we could study leaves on a tree 
as if they ‘knew the physical laws determining the amount of sunlight…’ (1953: 19) in the following 
terms: ‘ Let us suppose that it is true that the assumption that a leaf subscribes to Scientific American 
and the Journal of Molecular Biology and that it understands what is contained therein enables us to 
predict what the distribution of leaves around a tree will be. Such a theory nonetheless provides a very 
poor basis for thinking about leaves (or trees). Our problem is to explain how leaves come to be 
distributed on a tree given that a tree does not have a brain.’ (1994: 17)  
Implicit in the second view is the assumption that we are not working in a theoretical vacuum in 
which we do not know our research questions. The social embeddedness of scientific effort means that 
we do not (need to) consider absurd hypotheses just because they may turn out to be predictively 
relevant. In addition, correlation analyses resting on several theoretical, coding, and other 
assumptions, it is difficult to find true causality by analysing qualitatively interesting cases that have 
been revealed to us from a correlation analysis. Students of inter-branch relations have long been 
aware of the pitfalls of poorly theorized correlation analyses that lead to ambiguous and 
uninterpretable results (Weingast & Moran 1983).  
Whatever the current score in the precedence debate between empiricists and theoreticians, the 
mere play of the match shows that many political scientists care about the reasonableness of their 
theoretical assumptions and hypotheses.
2 
2.2. The choice of a theory and the choice criteria  
Having established (or opted for assuming) the cardinal (or important) role of theory, we need to make 
a second important decision: which theory? For any research question there are usually plural 
alternatives. Whether such pluralism is good or bad is a larger debate that has been addressed 
elsewhere (see note 1). The fact is that we must choose.  
Note first that, in practice, few scholars choose their theoretical informant on the basis of scientific 
criteria. Usually, several factors converge to create path-dependent sequences, whereby initially 
contingent choices are reinforced to create hysteresis effects. Such factors include herding, emulation, 
mentoring, and immediate precedent. Crucially, they also include resource limitations that render non-
choice rational.  
Note second that some particularly talented scholars may be able to shun choice and directly 
compare different theories against empirical data. But, most of should fear that such direct 
comparisons create more problems than they can possibly resolve (e.g. the test becomes one among 
competing assumptions, not hypotheses). We therefore usually acknowledge that our intellectual 
limitations oblige us to descend to less abstract levels of thought, and thus to modelize. This means 
that we have to exclude some theories, and so the question remains: how do we choose among theories? 
The answer is tricky, thorny, risky, and, in our current practice, problematic. It is tricky because 
choice is difficult when we have not previously worked with all possible theories. It is thorny because 
understanding theories is an intellectual exercise that consumes many of our limited financial, 
temporal, intellectual, and possibly even psychological resources.
3 It is risky because (a) one has to 
constantly acknowledge numerous and evolving nuances without yielding to rigid typologizing, and 
(b) once a choice is made, there is no short-run revisionist solution. Finally, in our current practice it is 
                                                      
2    Note also the limits of the theory/method dichotomy: if two theories support the same empirical observations, 
methodological tools will be needed to disentangle them.  
3   E.g. it is not always easy to maintain intact morale when reading some of the founding fathers’ equations – see Akerlof 
(1970), Banks (1990), McKelvey (1976), and even Williamson (1975, 1984). Whence the epigram from Williamson.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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problematic, because too many works do not explicate (or outright skip) that crucial step—whence the 
epigram from Whitehead.  
On the other hand, we do have guidelines that can assist our choice. Although not everybody agrees 
on the hierarchy of choice criteria, such criteria do exist. First, a theory needs to be internally 
consistent, logically complete, and falsifiable. It is internally consistent when its constitutive 
propositions are not mutually contradictory. It is logically complete when the resulting hypotheses 
flow from the assumptions. And it is falsifiable when it is non-tautological and specific enough to 
enable the deduction of hypotheses that can be proven wrong.
4 The first step of any truly scientific 
inquiry consists in showing the satisfaction of these criteria. Then comes the second step, which 
consists in checking the tripartite fit between the theory, the research questions, and the specific 
empirical field in which these questions are asked. (See Coase 1972, Solow 2001, Williamson 2002. 
Philosophers call this ‘relevance’.) As demonstrated below, current practice in inter-branch relations 
does not only neglect these steps of the analysis: it often violates some, or all, of these criteria.  
3. Economic theories and research in inter-branch relations 
This section argues that inter-branch relations studies would benefit by adopting the lens of transaction 
costs-economizing, applied to politics. Nevertheless, this choice must be determined by purely 
scientific criteria. For this reason, I first present the three main economic theories that inform current 
research efforts (PA, TCE, and ICT), and then the reasons why TCE offers a more promising venue 
than the other two theories.  
3.1. The menu of economic theories: PA, TCE, and ICT 
Due to the benefits associated with careful theorizing, many political scientists have turned for 
inspiration to economics. In order to test Lowi’s ‘congressional abdication’ thesis (1969), a political-
economic research agenda was defined. The resulting debates made a qualitative leap following the 
works of Fiorina 1977, Shepsle 1979, Weingast & Moran 1983, Weingast 1984, and Moe 1982, 1984. 
Eventually, rational choice institutionalists succeeded in furthering the intellectual frontiers of the 
discipline, and especially those of inter-branch relations studies. (The best review is Bendor 1988. See 
also Epstein & O’Halloran 1999: 14-33, Bendor, Glazer & Hammond 2001, Miller 2005.) Eventually, 
the initial appeal of some economic theories waned [as with the radical indolence and buccaneering 
theory of Niskanen (1971), or the blame-shifting thesis of Fiorina], while that of others waxed. This 
article focuses on theories in the latter category, and in particular on currently popular economic theories. 
More specifically, the focus is on the following three theories: principal-agent (‘PA’), transactions-
cost economics (‘TCE’), and incomplete contract theory (‘ICT’). Other sources of their appeal 
notwithstanding, these theories satisfy the aforementioned choice criteria, at least in economics 
(internal consistency, logical completeness, falsifiability, and relevance). Let us then turn to a brief 
presentation of each one of these theories, preceded by an indication of its current success in political science. 
-Principal-Agent (‘PA’): asymmetric information, frictionless-ness, complete contracts, and ex 
ante optimization 
PA models are the most popular economic theory among political scientists who work on inter-branch 
relations. (Bendor et al. 2001) As an example of that popularity, consider this non-exhaustive list of 
Europeanist works that explicitly refer to PA: Ballman, Epstein & O’Halloran 2002, Bergman 2000, 
                                                      
4   Trade-offs may easily creep in. For example, a theory that struggles to achieve internal consistency may introduce an ad 
hoc assumption, and by the same token loose in terms of logical completeness. As we shall see in Section 3, that is the 
case if incomplete contracts theory. Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/04 © 2007 Yannis Karagiannis  5 
Blom-Hansen 2005, Doleys 2000, Egan 1998, Franchino 2000, 2001, Garrett 1992, Garrett & 
Weingast 1995, Gilardi 2001, Jun 2003, Kassim & Menon 2003, Lane & Ersson 2003, Majone 1996a, 
1996b, 1997, 2001, Pierson 1996, Pollack 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, Rasmussen 2005, Stone 
Sweet & Caporaso 1998, Tallberg 2002, Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2002, Tsebelis & Garrett 2001, 
Wilks & Bartle 2002. That list does not include works that simply refer to PA but are not applications 
of it, nor the dozens of Americanist studies, nor the new applications to international organizations.
5 
And, workshops on PA abound.
6 So, PA is extremely popular and bound to develop even more. And 
yet, our understanding of PA seems severely flawed: popularity and ‘pop PA’ seem to develop hand-
in-hand. 
In economics, PA refers to a set of normative models that analyse the effects of asymmetric 
information on the design of resource allocation mechanisms aimed at securing efficient profit-
sharing. (The intellectual foundations are Berle & Means 1932, Arrow 1964, and Akerlof 1970; the 
actual models are best described in Ross 1973, Holmström 1979, and Laffont & Martimort 2001.) 
Asymmetric information poses the potential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and 
hence leads to some necessarily positive amount of rent extraction. The principals have to distinguish 
between different types of agents by designing adequately discriminating incentives (i.e. incentives 
that have the property of minimising the value of rents). The tasks of the analyst are therefore the 
following: (1) treat the desired resource allocation mechanism as the unknown; (2) solve the 
simultaneous equations that correspond to the constraints on the principals’ profits, and, as applicable, 
to the agents’ participation, incentive, renegotiation-proofness, and coalition incentive compatibility 
constraints; and finally (3) propose a second-best contract that optimally resolves the many trade-offs 
faced by the principals.
7 Once these three tasks are completed, PA analysis ends. In order to perform 
these tasks, PA works under a certain number of necessary assumptions:  
First, all actors are assumed to be fully rational and individualistic. This implies that principals are 
Bayesian expected utility-maximizers, and therefore that they anticipate their agents’ subsequent 
behaviour, and optimize accordingly. It also implies that agents will strategically control their valuable 
information regarding their type and their moral hazard actions (usually, their effort variable
8). For the 
purposes of analysis, this assumption means that principals are as hyper-rational as the expert analyst, 
and therefore that they will be able to perform the same backward induction operations as the expert 
analyst does. This rationality assumption has the crucial consequence of locating the action at the 
contracting stage, and not at the ex post contracting one. In other words, all potential contingent events 
will be fully insured at the time of contracting (i.e. all relevant premiums will be charged at the time of 
contracting). Hence, ex post contracting agency losses cannot be explained in PA terms.  
Second, the main problem is the uneven distribution of information between voluntarily 
cooperating actors. In other words, the main issue concerns the effects of information asymmetry on 
market relationships. This implies that principals cannot force  their agents to reveal information: 
                                                      
5   For the Americanist literature, see Miller 2005 and references therein. For applications to international organizations, see 
Hawkins, Lane, Nielson & Tierney 2006, and the individual chapters therein.  
6    Counting only since 2002 and for top-50 Universities and associations, the list includes at least 8 conferences or 
workshops. More information is available on demand. (For rankings, see Hix 2004) 
7   Space limitations impede the fuller explanation of these (and other) important concepts. I have just completed a project 
that clarifies all these economic concepts for political-scientific use. Readers who need urgent access to the research 
results are invited to contact me directly. The same applies to the other theories presented here, plus positive agency 
theory. (I have reviewed the genesis of these theories, their development, their current form, their comparative scopes, 
strengths and weaknesses, their applications in political science, and the problems in those applications). 
8   It is important to know that most models of moral hazard are based on the assumption of egoistic indolence. Political 
scientists have often referred to other motives (i.e. to hidden action on variables other than effort). To the best of my 
knowledge, however, they have not worked out the intuitive, mathematical, and graphical implications of this. To give 
just one example, a second-best resource allocation mechanism would presumably differ if the agent systematically wants 
to do more rather than less.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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agents have a credible outside option—attempt to squeeze them, and they will escape. Thus, principals 
have to figure out the best proposal that satisfies agents’ participation, incentive, renegotiation-
proofness, and coalition incentive compatibility constraints. Crucial in that respect is the fact that PA 
analysis does not admit that vertical integration should be assumed to reduce asymmetric information. 
(Though more recent efforts address the idea that different organizational forms generate different 
degrees and costs of asymmetric information—see Aghion & Tirole 1997.) Hence, unless a situation 
is characterised by the presence of (a) demonstrable and relevant information asymmetries, and (b) a 
credible outside option for the agent, it is not a PA situation.  
Third, the principals may not know the private information of the agents, but the probability 
distribution of this information is common knowledge. This implies that the principals possess some 
knowledge that allows them to roughly evaluate the main trade-offs, to calculate the range of incentive 
feasible contracts, and to attempt to optimize accordingly. Nevertheless, the fact remains that PA 
models assume that the principals do not know, and cannot know, the private information of the 
agents. Hence, the cognitive and behavioural assumptions of PA analysis are that actors are (a) 
perfectly rational, but (b) not omniscient. Assumptions of bounded rationality and/or omniscience 
place the analysis outside the realm of PA models.  
Fourth, since all actors are rational, both the principals and the agents have an infinite time horizon 
regarding their preferences. This implies that the principals already know what specific actions they 
would like to see being performed by the agents, and hence that their only problem is inducing those 
actions. Similarly, agents may vary in terms of their attitude towards risk, but they all know what 
functions they want to perform and what functions they don’t. This assumption is intimately related to 
the three preceding ones, and it reinforces the focus on the contracting (as opposed to the ex post 
contracting) stage. Because principals (and agents) know (the probability distribution of) what they 
previously wanted, what they currently want, and what they might subsequently come to want, they 
are able to anticipate the probability of renegotiation risks, and thus include a corresponding premium 
in their original contract.  
And fifth, the action is asymmetric: principals are modelled as active actors that evaluate feasibility 
and correspondingly make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agents, and agents are modelled as passive 
actors who take or leave the offer. This implies that the agents do not have agenda-setting or fence-
keeping powers over the principals. Again, this assumption is intimately linked to the four preceding ones. 
-Transactions-Cost Economics (‘TCE’): opportunism, frictions, and ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs (with an emphasis on the latter)  
TCE has been a relative late-comer in political science, developing about a decade later than the first 
Americanist PA models. Nevertheless, the pioneering efforts of Susan Lohmann, Sharyn O’Halloran, 
and David Epstein have attracted increasing attention, on both sides of the Atlantic. (For references, 
see the penultimate paragraph of Section 1.) TCE has become increasingly appealing, and it is bound 
to develop even more. Unlike PA, however, political TCE scholarship typically insists on the 
adaptations needed to translate economic theory for political-scientific use. As will be discussed 
below, some important issues remain unresolved. 
In economics, TCE is a theory of contract that analyses the relationship between transaction costs 
and the need for continuous adaptation, and the effects of that relationship on the choice between 
different organizational forms. (The intellectual foundations are Coase 1937, Williamson 1967, 1968, 
1975, and Arrow 1969; the current models are best described in Williamson 1985, 1996, 2000, 2002, 
Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978, Joskow 1985, and Whinston 2002; the main political-scientific 
effort is Epstein & O’Halloran 1999: 34-51.) While PA analysis is a normative exercise geared 
towards the discovery of optimal contract solutions in different environments, TCE is a positive 
approach that aims at testing the theoretically-derived proposition that governance structures will vary Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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in accordance with the degree of hazard inherent in the corresponding transactions (i.e. firms will 
define their boundaries in view of economizing on transaction costs).  
In TCE, the dependent variable measures the degree of vertical integration, which ranges from nil 
(as in so-called Walrasian auction markets and in spot markets) to full (as in outright mergers). The 
goal is to determine the causes of observed variations of the dependent variable. The tasks of the 
analyst are three: (1) name and explicate the critical dimensions with respect to which transactions 
differ; (2) name and explicate the critical attributes with respect to which governance structures differ; 
and (3) work out the logic of ex post contracting efficient alignment. To perform these tasks, TCE 
works under a certain number of clear and necessary assumptions, to which we now turn.  
First, all actors are assumed to be boundedly rational and opportunistic. Bounded rationality means 
that actors are intendedly rational, but only imperfectly so. They thus differ from their counterparts in 
the hyper-rational (and therefore fictitious) world of PA. This difference has important ramifications. 
Complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete: they cannot contain all the necessary clauses that 
would secure the transaction against any future contingency, and actors cannot accurately evaluate 
(and charge) all relevant premiums at the time of contracting. It follows that actors cannot readily 
invoke a common knowledge of payoffs. Coupled with opportunism, it also follows that actions are 
not as verifiable as in PA. (Note that non-verifiability complicates the problem not only of the parties 
to the transaction, but also of a third-party arbiter of potential disputes, such as a judge.) Actors are 
far-sighted, but boundedly rational, and so the assumption of bounded rationality leads to locating the 
action not only at the contracting stage, but also at the ex post contracting one. Hence, the main 
mission of economic organization is to deal with this uncertain world by creating adaptation-
enhancing institutions (i.e. governance structures, or ‘private-ordering efforts’) that allow parties to 
engage in voluntary, ordered, and mutually beneficial exchange. Contracts are ‘entire but incomplete’. 
Second, TCE assumes that the use of the market mechanism is not costless. In other words, it 
assumes the existence of transaction costs. Intuitively, these transaction costs can be understood as the 
economic equivalent of physical friction when an activity is transposed from one technologically 
separable surface to another. More analytically, they have been broken down into the following 
categories: (a) search and information costs; (b) bargaining costs; (c) costs of executing multiple 
contracts; (d) monitoring and enforcement costs; (e) public policy incentives to avoid the market; and 
(f) costs of protecting trade secrets. Note that some of these categories contradict the fundamental 
assumptions of PA analysis. For example, bargaining costs presuppose that the parties actually 
bargain, i.e. that there is no simple take-it-or-leave-it offer by one of them. Similarly, the costs of 
executing multiple contracts, and monitoring and enforcement costs, presuppose that appeals to a 
third-party arbiter (commonly, the judiciary) is not only problematic (due to non-verifiability), but also 
costly. Hence, TCE differs from PA in that it assumes the presence of positive transaction costs. Some 
of these transaction costs refer to the ex post contracting phase (the ‘execution’ phase). 
Third, as it transpires in the discussion of the first and second assumptions, the main problem is to 
tame the negative consequences of ex post contracting opportunism. Although opportunism may or 
may not be nefarious, it can lead to the collapse of the projected transaction, hence to the non-
realization of mutual benefit, and hence to economic inefficiency. Two crucial points need to be 
highlighted in that respect: 
1)  Its insistence on opportunism leads TCE to assume that restrictive contractual agreements are not 
malignant (i.e. they should not be systematically explained by reference to the parties’ 
monopolising instincts) but benign (i.e. they are explainable by reference to the notion of 
transactions-cost economizing). Thus, for example, vertical restraints between a supplier of a 
commodity and a seller of that commodity will not be unambiguously explained by their desire to 
foreclose the market to competitors, but by their desire to secure their transaction against each 
other’s potentially opportunistic ex post contracting behaviour. Although this assumption may 
appear too technical at first glance to be relevant to political scientists, its relevance is easy to 
demonstrate. For example, where Lowi (1969) argued that legislators abdicate by delegating Yannis Karagiannis 
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powers to the bureaucracy, a TCE analyst would argue that such delegation may be explained by 
reference to transaction cost-economizing strategies. (What remains to be seen, however, is the 
nature of the relationship between the economic concept of integration and the political concept of 
delegation.) 
2)  Opportunism would not be problematic (and hence TCE would become less relevant), if only the 
market were competitive. As in neo-classical economics, competition would have a disciplinary 
effect on potentially opportunistic behaviour. Where TCE becomes relevant is where markets are 
not competitive, and hence where market power prevails. In addition, the source of marker power 
may be not only structural, but also relational. In other words, even in otherwise competitive 
markets, contractual relationships themselves may lead to a certain degree of lock-in, and hence to 
bilateral monopoly.  
Hence, TCE belongs to the group of theories that form the ‘efficiency branch of contract’, and 
which includes PA (Williamson 1985: 26-29). But TCE also differs from PA, in that it concentrates on 
the effects of in-built monopoly.  
Fourth, there is a trade-off between production cost-economizing and transaction cost-
economizing. Absent transaction costs, a firm would always seek to procure and contract in the open 
market—perhaps to the point of self-dilution. For example, all actors would permanently scan the 
market in search for the best deals, i.e. for production cost-minimizing deals. By virtue of the first and 
second assumptions, however, such scanning and searching activities are assumed to be costly: they 
contribute to a rise in transaction costs. Eventually, protracted scanning and searching efforts will 
result in transaction costs that will out-weigh the corresponding gains in terms of production costs. To 
illustrate this crucial point, take the example of a shoe manufacturer who needs to buy leather that she 
uses as raw material for her shoes. She will scan the market in search for the leather supplier who 
offers the best value for money. Unless she finds that supplier, she foregoes the opportunity to 
economize on production costs. And, unless she negotiates an optimal deal, she foregoes the 
opportunity of further economizing. Nevertheless, her market search (and subsequent negotiations) 
cannot go on forever: eventually, it will amount to a cost item that dwarfs any possible gains. Hence, 
TCE assumes a trade-off between production cost-economizing efforts and transaction cost-
economizing ones. The two categories of costs are analytically distinguishable, but they both refer to 
the production of the same good.  
And fifth, the development of lock-ins among trading partners leads the value of the relationship to 
exceed the value of the trading partners’ outside options (see also point (2) in the third assumption). In 
a bilateral relationship, that means that one trading partner will be able to extract quasi-rents from the 
other partner—this is commonly referred to as the ‘hold-up problem’. Given that contracts are 
incomplete and that promise is not self-enforcing, actors will become increasingly opportunistic, and 
will thus seek to increase their share of such quasi-rents. Eventually, such quasi-market transactions 
will become obviously inefficient: improvements in the welfare of one party will correspond to 
automatic deteriorations in the welfare of the other. Firms that find themselves in similar situations 
(and firms that fear finding themselves in similar situations) might opt for taking the matter to a court 
of law. But, non-verifiability precludes this. Such firms will therefore either outright not enter into the 
initial contractual relationship that degenerates, or opt for more securing governance.  
-Incomplete Contracts Theory (‘ICT’, or the property rights approach)  
The least we can say as political scientists is that we have a very incomplete knowledge of ICT. (But 
this may be a rational strategy that minimizes our own production and transaction costs!) There is 
actually no political-scientific literature, be it on delegation, discretion, and control, that is so labelled. 
Nevertheless, a simple summary of ICT will hopefully prove that ICT has had a profound impact on 
the literature—including in political TCE approaches (via Epstein & O’Halloran 1999: 42). As will be 
shown, that problem is due to our misunderstanding of the differences between ICT and TCE.  Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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In economics, ICT is associated with the works of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (Grossman & 
Hart 1982, 1986; Hart 1988, 1995). They started by expressing their sympathy with TCE, and by 
acknowledging the presence of ex ante transaction costs, asset specificities, opportunism, and 
incomplete contracts (whence differentiating themselves from PA models). They also differentiated 
themselves from the positive theory of agency
9, defining the firm as consisting not of a nexus of 
contracts between voluntarily participating individuals, but as being composed of its assets.  
On the other hand, Grossman & Hart drew a clear distinction between ICT and TCE, too. They 
argued that TCE exhibits mainly three important problems:  
a)  It exaggerates the benefits of integration, by assuming that it automatically turns hostile suppliers 
into docile employees.
10 Thus, TCE foregoes the opportunity to analyze power relationships, and 
their institutional objects and effects;  
b)  It does not distinguish between (i) activities that are carried out via contract between separate 
owners, and (ii) activities that are carried out in a single ownership unit. Thus, TCE does not 
answer the question of what limits the size of the firm; and  
c)  TCE is unable to distinguish between a structure composed only of in-house employees, and a 
structure composed only of exclusive agents. Thus, it fails to give concrete meaning to the 
term ‘integration’. 
For these reasons, Grossman & Hart relied on the concepts developed in the classic literature on 
property rights (e.g. Alchian & Demsetz 1972). They distinguished between the situation where a 
contractor uses the production facilities that the firm provides to him, and the situation where the 
contractor uses his own production facilities. ‘If the firm owned [all the] important assets of the 
independent agents, then we would say that such a company had the same degree of integration as a 
company in which the retail sales force was composed of ‘employees’.’ (1986: 694)
11 On this basis, 
they made the following four groups of assumptions.  
First, at the beginning there is a competitive market in identical potential trading partners. That 
market determines the ex ante division of surplus between the principal and the agent. Optimization 
involves maximizing the principal’s benefit subject to the agent’s participation constraint. (Unlike in 
PA models, there is neither uncertainty nor asymmetric information, and thus no incentive 
compatibility constraint. Unlike in TCE, there is common knowledge of payoffs, costless bargaining, 
and hence no ex post alignment problems.) Second, the payment method used by the principal to 
compensate her agent (whether he is an employee or an independent contractor) is some function of 
the observable states of nature and the observable performance of the parties to the contract. Third, 
contracts are incomplete, in the sense that ex post residual rights, ex ante investments, and ex post 
                                                      
9   The positive theory of agency (‘PTA’) is associated with the works of Michael Jensen and William Meckling (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976, 1979). PTA has also had a strong indirect (unconscious?) influence on political science. In a nutshell, 
PTA views (a) actors as varyingly rational; (b) the firm as an open nexus of voluntary contracts; (c) contracts as 
incomplete and subject to periodical re-negotiations; (d) the problem as consisting in defining property rights and 
calculating agency costs under conditions of informational asymmetry; and (e) the court system as an efficient dispute 
resolution mechanism. Based on these assumptions, the unit of analysis is the agent, and the temporal focus is the ex ante 
stage (i.e. not the allocation of ex post contracting costs). PTA influenced the political-scientific literature through several 
references in Moe 1984: 740. It was rejected by Epstein & O’Halloran on the grounds that, like any PA theory, it does not 
relate to the theory of the firm, and ‘tells us little about the origin of this nexus or why two nexuses do not merge to form 
a single nexus.’ (1999: 39). As with the rest of the economic theories discussed here, more information on PTA is 
available on demand. To the extent that most political scientists assume some degree of corporative-ness in the 
organizations that they study, this literature may not be the most relevant for our purposes.  
10  This was a critique of Williamson’s assumption that the contract law that applies to private-ordering institutions is that of 
forbearance.  
11  This important point can serve to clarify the difference between the concepts of integration and delegation. Integration 
means acquisition of property rights over assets, while delegation relates to contractual compensation. Delegation occurs 
independently of integration.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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benefits to the respective parties, cannot be totally foreseen, specified and contracted ex ante. (Note 
that incompleteness means that some assets are not contracted upon, and hence that their owners retain 
full control over them). And fourth, integration in itself does not make any new variable observable to 
both parties,
12 does not change the cost of writing contracts (which is nil), and hence cannot be 
associated with complete contracting. On the other hand, integration does affect the identity of the 
person who has control over those provisions not included in the contract. 
On these assumptions, Grossman & Hart built a two-periods model which applied equally to 
vertical and horizontal relationships, be they inside or outside the firm. In the ex ante period, two 
parties make relationship-specific investments; in the ex post period, some further (partly 
unforeseeable, unforeseen and thus non-contractible) production decisions are taken and the benefits 
from the relationship are realized. The incompleteness of the contract regarding (some) ex post 
decisions and benefits makes it necessary to allocate residual rights of control ex ante. In the ex post 
period, the state of the world is revealed, whatever information asymmetries existed disappear, further 
decisions are taken
13, and the parties can renegotiate and re-contract on further actions and residual 
rights of control. [Such renegotiations and re-contracting are assumed to be costless; ex post costless-
ness is justified by the fact that the state of nature is now realized, and hence by the fact that each party 
now knows its own needs as well as the needs of the other. This possibility amounts to ex post 
efficient allocation, and renders the initial allocation of property rights ex post irrelevant. Crucially, 
however, the distribution of the ex post surplus (as opposed to its amount) is not insensitive to 
property rights: if the agent owns his production facilities, he may refuse to continue the relationship 
unless he extracts more surplus—or he may be prepared to give up his right for a side payment as part 
of a renegotiation. In turn, this will affect ex ante investment decisions on non-contractible assets.  
Finally, assuming that the parties allocate ownership rights in a way that minimizes ex ante 
investment distortions, Grossman & Hart elaborated their view against the usual argument that 
integration can only expand the feasible set. Integration, they argued, distorts the incentives of the 
principal, and (given the unspecified nature of his residual rights) she cannot commit to intervene only 
selectively in her agent’s operations. Hence, integration leads to overinvestment by the integrating 
firm, and underinvestment by the integrated one: it comes with benefits, but also with costs. Thus, the 
only solution consists in a clearer specification of property rights. Residual rights of control over 
assets (or actions) determine who owns which assets (or actions). 
3.2. The science of inter-branch relations and the promise of political TCE theory.  
The main argument in this sub-section is that our science of inter-branch relations could greatly profit 
by focusing on TCE, applied to political science. This is shown in three steps. The first step documents 
the proposition that political-scientists have not paid enough attention to the differences between the 
three economic theories. The second shows that the adoption of PA or ICT would force us to make too 
many heroic assumptions, and to unduly limit the scope of our investigations. The third shows that, if 
appropriately adapted, TCE is a necessary and sufficient theory for our purposes.  
                                                      
12  This was a direct criticism of Arrow (1975), who had argued that vertical integration economizes on communication 
costs, but who had not explained why (he had not explained why the incentives facing opportunistic agents change with 
integration).  
13  For our purposes, it is necessary to note that each party takes such further decisions as a unitary actor: the choice on such 
decisions is (from an organizational point of view) unproblematic, because any subordinate can take it. In Grossman & 
Hart’s words, ‘no special skills are required … [S]ince there are many subordinates available, none is in a position to 
refuse to carry out the owner’s wishes or to argue about terms.’ (at 699) Note two things here: (1) This leaves the 
question of the existence of the firm unanswered (if no special skills are required, the corresponding decision could be 
sub-contracted externally without risk); and (2) This competition among subordinates is not necessarily found in all 
political settings.  Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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-The political-scientific confusion of different economic theories  
It is necessary to re-emphasize that PA, TCE, and ICT differ in many important respects. Each of these 
theories scores differently on the criteria of completeness, consistency, falsifiability, and relevance. 
Nevertheless, they have all been developed and applied profitably in different settings. But, start 
confusing those theories, and all their (varying) qualities are lost. Indeed, PA, TCE, and ICT make 
different assumptions about (a) actors’ rationality, (b) the nature of the firm and the interaction 
between actors, (c) the role of non-verifiability, and thus of the judicial branch of government, and (d) 
the locus of action and the importance of potential ex post contracting issues. It seems fair to say that 
the only commonly shared assumption is that actors behave opportunistically, and therefore that 
promise is not self-enforcing. But, although this single common assumption results in a common 
interest in institutions and contracts, those theories differ.  
Furthermore, due to their different assumptions, the three theories develop in distinct ways, and 
generate different hypotheses. PA sets out to describe optimal contracts, and thereby acquires a 
distinctively normative dimension.
14 On the contrary, TCE sets out to analyse empirical differences in 
governance structures (with an emphasis on ex post delegation issues), and therefore maintains a 
markedly positive character. Halfway between PA and TCE, ICT sets out to discover the optimal 
allocation of risk-sharing and property rights, takes a positive perspective, and is limited to ex ante 
allocation issues.
15 It should be obvious from this that these economic theories do not constitute inter-
changeable building blocks. On the contrary, each has its own logic and addresses its own research questions. 
The classic joke about academics and light bulbs may be relevant here. (– ‘How many academics 
are needed to fix a light bulb?’ – ‘What do you mean ‘a light bulb’?’) As things stand, the main 
question is not how much work is left to complete the economics-for-delegation research programme. 
Rather, the main question concerns what we have done with (and to) these economic theories. Only 
after sorting that out can we concentrate on the issue of what we can do with them. Yet, our use of 
these theories has consistently tended to corrupt, mix, and confuse them. Thus, however technically 
sophisticated our regression analyses or our analytic narratives might become, spotting a positive 
correlation or a plausible causal chain is (a) theoretically uninterpretable, and (b) methodologically 
non-generalisable.  
Before going on to pinpoint specific instances of theoretical confusion in political-scientific 
scholarship, note that some economists have contributed to this confusion. For example, in his path-
breaking (and otherwise fascinating and essential) empirical test of TCE, Joskow referred to TCE and 
PA, and noted that ‘it would be productive to integrate the two approaches.’ (1985: 36 n.8)
16 On the 
positive side, until recently only Williamson insisted on the differences between TCE, PA, ICT, and 
PTA. (Though all the foundational papers explicated their points of departure from previous 
approaches.) Today, the economic literature offers several rich and insightful reviews (e.g. Williamson 
2000, 2002, Malin & Martimort 2000, Chiappori & Salante 2000, Whinston 2001, Brousseau & 
Glachant 2002, Martimort forthcoming). Unfortunately, the complex message does not seem to travel 
well across disciplines.  
                                                      
14  Extensive work in the 1980s and 90s relaxed some (but not all) of these assumptions: on the most important point 
(renegotiation costs due to the impossibility of full commitment) see Dewatripont 1988; Hart & Tirole 1988; Laffont & 
Tirole 1993: chapter 9. Interestingly, Hart & Tirole (1988) found that non-commitment may lead to the standard Coasian 
durable good model, and hence (in terms of the analysis) to the need to incorporate transaction costs.  
15  For the sake of completeness, note also that PTA sets out to discover the consequences of ‘complex information’ in terms 
of optimal risk-sharing solutions.  
16  See also Alchian 1984: 39, Milgrom & Roberts 1992, and Williamson 1996: 65. In general, many economists have 
argued for an integrated treatment. … But none has fully achieved it, and recent efforts have focused on differentiating, 
rather than combining, theories (see the main text).  Yannis Karagiannis 
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In the history of our discipline, formal deductive models of inter-branch relationships owe much to 
Barry Weingast and colleagues, and Terry Moe (see Bendor 1988, and Miller 2005). Space limitations 
prohibit an extensive epidemiologic argument here; but note that absolutely all volumes and articles on 
inter-branch relationships, be it in the USA, in Europe, or in the context of international organizations, 
refer (directly or one-step indirectly) to both Weingast and Moe. This path-dependent sequence 
unarguably shows that our efforts are indeed cumulative. On the other hand, it also shows our 
extensive reliance on past authority, and hence our vulnerability to past mistakes.  
We owe to Weingast (alone or with Moran, Marshall, Noll, McCubbins, Calvert, Garrett, or 
Snyder) several important concepts such as ‘congressional dominance’, ‘observational equivalence’, 
‘administrative procedures stacking the deck’, ‘authority vs. discretion’, etc. And yet, in his 
foundational work Weingast neglected to justify his choice of PA, rather than PTA, TCE, or ICT. He 
did not offer a justification for the assumptions of perfectly rational actors, passive executive agents, 
or executive agents with a credible outside option. (Though he did subsequently investigate 
appointment procedures, where the last two assumptions may be realistic – see Calvert, McCubbins & 
Weingast 1989, and Snyder & Weingast 2000.) Even more puzzling is the fact that this foundational 
work referred to PA (not TCE or ICT), but at the same time assumed the existence of ex post agency 
losses. Since, under PA assumptions, actors can only conclude complete contracts and rely for their 
enforcement on an efficient judiciary, Weingast’s original works exhibited important internal 
inconsistencies, and logical incompleteness. By the same token, they exhibited an important degree of 
irrelevance, since PA theory cannot be used to analyse the ex post control of the bureaucracy (i.e. one 
of the main questions in the field). 
Turning to the other main figure in this field, Terry Moe (writing initially with Gary Miller), he 
also made a number of very significant contributions. Unfortunately, however, he also contributed to 
the confusion between the different economic theories. On the positive side, Moe consolidated the 
research agenda (1982), advanced our understanding of the consequences of the existence of multiple 
principles while engaging in significant empirical applications (1987), and divulged the economic 
theories while warning of potential translation problems for political scientists (1984). And yet, his 
work is both the exemplar and the main source of numerous confusions. He purported to present ‘an 
approach perhaps best characterized by three elements: a contractual perspective on organizational 
relationships, a focus on hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent models.’ (1984: 
739) At the same time, however, he did not distinguish between PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT, but only 
between rational choice institutional approaches (including Williamsonian TCE), and the behavioural 
tradition in organizational analysis (i.e. Simon, March, Cyert and Olsen). Of course, Moe warned that 
his ‘review is designed as an introduction, stressing the basic concepts and arguments without 
dwelling on complicating details.’ (1984: 740) Unfortunately, however, he did not get the historical 
reconstruction of ideas right, and he therefore failed to explain the significance of these details. So 
much so that Williamson eventually warned Moe to revise his ‘joinder of transaction-cost economics 
with agency theory…’ (Williamson 1990: 264)  
Indeed, Moe’s classification of TCE is truly problematic. He variously includes it in the ‘New 
Economics of Organization’ (which is contrasted with neo-classical economics and with 
behaviouralism), and partly excludes it from it, by arguing that Williamson attempted to ‘integrate 
major components from the contractual and behavioural paradigms.’ (1984: 753). Similarly, Moe did 
not pick up the central assumption of a trade-off between production cost-economizing and transaction 
cost-economizing. And, even more consequentially, he did not offer a consistent view on the 
behavioural assumption of TCE: at one stage he classified it as a theory of ‘rational firms’ (at 752), 
and at another stage he construed it as a theory of bounded rationality, ‘in the Simon tradition.’ (at 
753) Again, Williamson warned political scientists about the perils of such confusions: ‘Although 
transaction-cost economics and agency theory work out of a common framework …, there are also 
differences (Williamson, 1988). For one thing, transaction-cost economics maintains that all complex 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete, whereupon a significant share of the contracting action is Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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borne by the ex post governance stage of contract. By contrast, agency theory works out of a 
comprehensive contracting setup, whence all of the contracting action in concentrated on the ex ante 
incentive alignment.’ (1990: 264)  
Systematic failure to note that warning has resulted in a kind of disciplinary primeval soup. (Quite 
astonishingly, we call that soup principal-agent!) Take three illustrative examples from the fastest 
growing area in political science, European Union studies.
17 First, Ballmann, Epstein & O’Halloran 
(2002) assert that comitology procedures used by Member States to supervise the European 
Commission is a typical PA relationship. At the same, however, they proceed to the analysis of ex post 
delegation maladaptations. Second, Pollack (1997, 2002, 2003, 2006) ‘draws upon principal-agent 
models of delegation of powers by legislative principals … to executive or judicial agents’ (2003: 4-5). 
At the same time, however, he discusses his transaction cost approach, its ramifications in terms of 
incomplete contracts and problems of credible commitments, and its empirical manifestations (e.g. 
2003: 20-24). And third, Tsebelis & Garrett build a PA model of delegation, discretion, and control. 
At the same time, however, they assert that (a) delegation contracts between the Council of Ministers 
and the Commission are always incomplete (365), and (b) that their simplifying assumption that the 
Council is the sole legislator is a mere empirical inaccuracy (366).  
-Why we do not (and should not) eat from our own primeval soup 
The discrepancy between our nominal commitment to PA and our practice begs the question: Why do 
we not stick to what we profess? If PA is too normative, why don’t we at least adopt ICT? The answer 
is two-fold: (a) PA and ICT make assumptions that are too strong for political-scientific purposes; and 
(b) applied to inter-branch relations, both theories exhibit an important degree of irrelevance. Each one 
of these limbs carries various smaller ones, and all deserve some consideration.  
First, consider PA and its assumptions. (Note that strong assumptions can be just strong or outright 
heroic. In addition, a strong assumption for the analysis of one empirical reality may become heroic 
for the analysis of another empirical reality—but the opposite may also be true). The most 
fundamental and consequential assumption of PA is that of perfect rationality of all relevant actors. 
For inter-branch relations, this can only be considered as a heroic assumption. One reason is that we 
have long known that most legislative and public-bureaucratic environments are characterised by low-
powered incentives and loose performance standards. Thus, although legislators may hope to engage 
in strategic manipulation of delegation to increase their re-election prospects, it remains true that ‘the 
legislator’s obvious powerlessness is itself a defence against constituency dissatisfaction. Lack of 
control over the bureaucracy can be as effective as complete control in a legislator’s reelection 
strategy.’ (Miller 2005: 212) [Note in connection to Miller’s lucid remark that it implies that 
politicians can always avoid the sanctions associated with (supposed) non-compliance.] A more 
fundamental reason is that we know from psychology that, in the absence of abundant cues and strong 
incentives, even deliberate modes of cognitive operation are plagued by anchoring and salience effects 
(Kahnemann 2003; see also Elster 1983). Combined with various political constraints to individual 
perfect rationality (e.g. party structures and ideologies), this means that cognitive rationality (if it 
operates) may not translate into instrumental rationality. And finally, in terms of empirical 
observations of the rationality hypothesis, we observe the opposite: complex contracts are incomplete, 
ex post alignment problems exist, and unintended consequences often appear. The bottom line is that 
the hyper-rational actors of PA are not the same as our political actors. (Absent the heroic assumption 
                                                      
17  By virtue of the identity of the publisher, the rank and affiliation of the authors, and the references made to them, those 
works form a biased sample. Nevertheless, the bias is towards well-known, top-quality, and most influential works. The 
empirical focus on the EU should not matter, since all authors are (or had been at the time of publication) based in top-
ranking American universities. (For rankings see Hix 2004) And indeed, the same arguments are frequently heard 
regarding US inter-branch relations (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran 1999: 28, Huber & Shipan 2000).  Yannis Karagiannis 
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of PA-like rationality, discussion of other assumptions becomes superfluous; but let us proceed as if 
that were not so.)  
Second, there may be good reason to believe that other PA assumptions are equally heroic, at least 
for our purposes. Consider, for example, the ability of the principal to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to 
the agent, the existence of a credible outside option for the agent, or the performance-based 
compensation contracts. Unless we focus on the limited topic of appointments (in which case we loose 
some relevance), there is no obvious reason to assume that incumbent agencies have nil negotiating 
powers, or that they have an option to exit the system, or that they even care about true performance. 
Of course, bureaucrats may have an outside option to follow the dictates of another principal, but this 
creates considerable analytical difficulties that we have not yet adequately addressed. Finally, 
regarding the assumption of a costless, efficient, and benevolent judiciary, plenty of evidence seems to 
prove that courts in politics are more often than not political courts. The exemplars here are the 
teleological interpretation of the Treaty of Rome by the European Court of Justice, and the progressive 
policy-making role of the Warren Court in the USA.  
Note that PA assumptions are not unexplainable as such. Rather, they are all due to the essentially 
normative character of PA analysis. In PA, the analyst does not aim at developing empirical tests 
about past delegation, discretion and control patterns. Rather, her goal is to design an optimal resource 
allocation mechanism for the future. The most secure way of doing this (for methodological and 
substantive reasons that relate to the analyst’s professional role) is to make these strong/heroic 
assumptions. By the same token, however, PA analysis becomes irrelevant to our positive political-
scientific concerns. Inasmuch as ours is a positive-historical discipline that is not commissioned by a 
(benevolent) dictator in search for an optimal constitution, we should not be interested in making such 
heroic assumptions.18  
Let us now turn to ICT. The appealing features of ICT are numerous. For example, its emphasis on 
ownership of physical assets might be easily transposed to the study of political property rights, as 
defined in a Constitution. (Though Grossman & Hart warn that ‘the formal extension of our analysis to 
[the ex ante specification of the quality of input, as opposed to quantity] is by no means 
straightforward.’ 1986: 700, 717) In addition, ICT raises a useful critique of the TCE view that 
‘behaviour changes when one of the self-interested owners becomes an equally self-interested 
employee of the other owner.’ (Grossman & Hart 1986: 692) Furthermore, ICT raises an interesting 
question: ‘if vertical integration always reduces transaction costs … what limits the size of the firm?’ 
(692-93). Taken together, these points force us to think about the difference between integration and 
delegation. This difference might be the single most important conceptual point for the analysis of 
inter-branch relations. So, why have political scientists not bought the menu of ICT? And why should 
they not buy it? 
One reason is that inter-branch scholarship does not, and should not, limit itself to the study of ex 
ante definitions of property rights. Doing so would unduly limit the scope of our inquiries to the issue 
of delegated discretion. It would thus leave the questions of the causes of delegation, and of ex post 
control, unaddressed. Yet Weingast’s contributions (especially Weingast & Moran 1983) have defined 
an ambitious research agenda on ex post issues, and this agenda cannot just be assumed away. 
Inasmuch as ICT limits the scope of the analysis exactly like PA, it is equally irrelevant for our purposes. 
A related reason is that ICT works on the assumption of the initial existence of two separate firms, 
each with its own assets. Two points need to be made in that respect: 
                                                      
18  A counter-argument could be that political scientists perform PA analysis for normative purposes; they therefore need to 
establish first whether there are currently agency losses, then identify their origin, and hence propose normative solutions. 
The problem with this argument is that it admits that actors are currently boundedly rational. Economic PA analysis does 
not make such assumptions. It is a ‘toy theory’.  Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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a)  ICT focuses on the types of contract that can be achieved given the features of pre-existing 
institutions (i.e. institutions are defined exogenously). That contrasts with TCE, which ‘proposes a 
logically consistent theoretical framework to endogenize the forming of both institutions and 
governance structures.’ (Brousseau & Fares 2000) Given our interest in the explanation of 
institutions, TCE should be preferred.  
b)  In ICT integration corresponds to the rational acquisition of one firm’s assets by the other, where 
such acquisition is less costly than drafting fully contingent contracts. Two points need to be noted 
here. First, ICT suffers from a fundamental problem of inconsistency and completeness. It does 
not explain why rational actors cannot write complete contracts. More specifically, in order to 
explain the existence of writing costs, ICT refers to bounded rationality, in a world that is 
otherwise perfectly rational. Second, in ICT property rights are transferred through payment. It is 
payment that causes the selling party to loose its property rights, and the buying party to own 
them. ICT does not consider any other mechanism that has the property of securing a transaction 
and of mitigating conflict. In that world, there is no forbearance, cooperation, or ex post 
governance; there are only paid-for property rights (Grossman & Hart 1986: 698-99). Transposed 
to the study of inter-branch relations, this means that delegation decisions should be supported by 
inter-branch payments effectuated by the receiving branch to the benefit of the delegating branch. 
The difficulty in identifying such objective payments may be one of the chief justifications for 
political scientists’ preference for other theories.  
A third reason relates to the content given by ICT to the assumption of contractual incompleteness. 
Contrary to TCE, in ICT contractual incompleteness does not result from the parties’ bounded 
rationality, nor from uncertainty.
19 (This is consistent with the ICT assumption of symmetrically 
distributed information, which reduces uncertainty.) Rather, it results from the inabilities and 
inefficiencies of the judiciary. It is the courts’ inability to enforce certain agreements that pushes the 
firms to agree on transfers and on particular renegotiation schemes. Applied to political science, this 
means that an ICT model would need to incorporate two components: (a) a judge that is unable to 
enforce an optimal level of transactions, this being due to problems of non-verifiability; and (b) a 
legislative and an executive branch that are perfectly rational. The cost of incorporating these views 
seems too high. First, politics may differ from economics in that contracts that produce observable 
effects for the parties produce observable effects for the judge, too (and vice versa). And second, the 
assumption of a boundedly rational judge in a world populated by other rational actors introduces a 
degree of ad hoc-ness, which jeopardizes the possibility of arriving at a logically complete model.  
-The promise of TCE for the science of inter-branch relations  
The previous sections have demonstrated why (a) incompatible assumptions derived from different 
economic theories should not be mixed; and (b) PA and ICT might not be as appropriate to our 
analyses of inter-branch relations as initially thought. Proceeding by exclusion, this points to the 
adoption of TCE. But can that choice be based on anything more than a default condition? This sub-
section presents a general argument in favour of the view that TCE is (almost) sufficient. The 
argument here is that most TCE assumptions are not only intuitively appealing, but also readily 
translatable into inter-branch relations studies. One darker point, however, is the TCE assumption that 
the contract law that applies within organizations is the law of forbearance. The next section elaborates 
on this view, placing more emphasis on the ‘almost’.  
                                                      
19  To be more specific, ICT is extremely ambiguous regarding the concept of bounded rationality. In general, actors are 
assumed to be rational. Nevertheless, contractual incompleteness results from writing costs that are due to bounded 
rationality. The text here makes a ‘notwithstanding’ argument, giving ICT the benefit of the doubt regarding its internal 
consistency.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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Consider first the assumption of bounded rationality, which serves to differentiate TCE from PA 
and PTA. Perfect rationality in the PA and PTA fashion means that principals are always able to 
predict the probability of occurrence of all future contingencies, and that they can always place 
themselves in the shoes of the agent. On the contrary, bounded rationality in the TCE fashion means 
that political actors do not know all the solutions to the problems they face, that they are unable to 
calculate all possible outcomes of potential solutions, and that they cannot perfectly order these 
outcomes in a preference space. (It also means, however, that political actors will try to gain 
knowledge regarding all these matters, and that they will be forward-looking.) Substantial empirical 
evidence supporting this second view notwithstanding, there is a fundamental methodological reason 
why it makes sense to adopt it: given that we are less interested in normative design and more 
interested in explaining past patterns of delegation, discretion, and control, assuming that all data 
reflect a strict correspondence between original intentions and actual outcomes makes history collapse 
to a single identifiable point in the past. Several independent variables whose importance has been 
corroborated by political scientists over the decades would thereby need to be assumed away. This 
would create an omitted variable bias, which only normative PA can afford.  
Second, consider the identity of the actors who are boundedly rational, which serves to differentiate 
TCE from ICT. In ICT, the legislators and the bureaucracy act under conditions of Bayesian 
uncertainty. They therefore behave in a perfectly rational manner. On the other hand, the benevolent 
judge is boundedly rational, and this eventually leads legislators and bureaucrats to an ex ante 
definition of property rights. On the contrary, in TCE all actors are boundedly rational. The prevailing 
condition is not Bayesian uncertainty, but radical uncertainty. That impedes the calculation of a 
probability function of future events, and this (not the judge’s exceptional, and thus ad hoc, 
characteristics) creates contractual incompleteness. Political scientists who are not in a position to 
argue that (a) judges are neutral and/or less informed than other actors; nor that (b) actors implement 
an ex ante designed complete set of behavioural rules that solve all ex post coordination problems, 
correctly opt for TCE and not for ICT.  
Third, the TCE assumptions regarding (a) opportunism, (b) costly spot market-like transactions, 
and (c) the trade-off between production costs-economizing and transaction costs-economizing do not 
seem to pose particular problems in political science. Assumption (a) is common to all economic 
theories that do not assume that actors can easily commit to their agreements, and to most rational 
choice institutionalist analyses. Assumptions (b) and (c) are more peculiar to TCE and ICT, but to the 
best of my knowledge few political scientists have openly objected to them. (We shall come back to 
the crucial assumption regarding the existence of transaction costs in Section 4.)  
Fourth, it seems that we can readily agree with the TCE view that ‘the principal dimensions for 
describing transactions are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.’ (Williamson 1985: 72) 
Indeed, some political transactions are non-specific, while others are (e.g. Congress cannot demand a 
revision of the Merger Guidelines from anyone else than the two antitrust agencies). Some are more 
certain and some are more uncertain (e.g. those involving macro-economic policy may be more 
uncertain than those involving structural reforms). And some occur only occasionally, while others are 
recurrent (e.g. the Agriculture Council of Ministers of the European Union collaborates recurrently 
with the European Commission).  
Finally, the crucial test for TCE is the assumption that the contract law of internal organization is 
that of forbearance. According to Arrow (1975), vertical integration might be motivated by its positive 
effects in terms of alleviating problems of informational asymmetry. According to Laffont & 
Martimort (2001), however, ‘An obvious limitation of this approach is that it takes as exogenous the 
fact that vertical integration improves information.’ (47) But, according to Williamson, this can be 
accounted for by reference to the inaccessibility of courts and the resulting law of forbearance. Hence, 
‘courts will refuse to hear disputes between one internal division and another … Access to the courts 
being denied, the parties must resolve their differences internally. Accordingly, hierarchy is its own 
court of ultimate appeal.’ (1996: 98) This point is crucial because it reveals the relative scope of, on Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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the one hand, PA, PAT, and ICT, and, on the other hand, TCE. A little more analysis is warranted to 
demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of that debate.  
As already mentioned above, the assumption of forbearance was one of the main criticisms 
addressed by ICT and PTA to TCE. Based on Alchian & Demsetz’s management-as-an-intellectual-
deception thesis (1972: 777), Grossman & Hart (1986) argued that the TCE assumption of forbearance 
is illusional and deceptive because it serves to justify the unjustifiable: that integration creates 
immediate benefits by suppressing all internal principal-agent problems. For Alchian & Demsetz, and 
Grossman & Hart there is nothing, in contractual terms, to prove that the firm is different from the 
market. Absent intellectual artefacts, we should be able to proceed on the basis of a more realistic 
assumption, according to which simple integration does not guarantee any noticeable benefits.  
Williamson responded with a carefully crafted legal argument, both for the private sector 
(Williamson 1996: 97-100), and for the public sector of the economy (Williamson 1990). Beyond its 
immediate technical significance, that response showed that economists argued over personnel 
disputes, i.e. over the workings of internal organizational hierarchies, strictly defined. For TCE, such 
hierarchies work by substituting the law of forbearance and fiat in otherwise opportunistic 
transactions. By implication, that means that TCE is not, as such, a theory of delegation, but a theory 
of integration. If the goal is to tame opportunism, the solution is to institutionalise fiat, and this is 
achieved through forbearance-enhancing integration. The general proposition is that more complex 
transactions will lead to more integration—not to more delegation—because integration comes with 
forbearance. 
Consider now the innumerable political-scientific works that claim that legislators face a trade-off 
between control (where they do not delegate discretionary powers to bureaucrats) and expertise-based 
flexibility (where they do). Three facts stand out here. First, this is an essentially TCE approach—not 
a PA, PTA, or ICT one. For PA, PTA, and ICT, non-delegation does not suppress internal-to-the-
organization principal-agent problems (the Irrelevance Theorem applies, see Malin & Martimort 
2000). Second, in principle, that point should not pose additional problems to political scientists who 
study inter-branch relations. It can be readily translated into political science in the form of the 
following hypothesis: the more hazardous the political transactions that correspond to a policy area, 
the more legislators will integrate policy-making within the legislative branch of government. (As we 
are about to see, however, a lot revolves around the question of how we construe hazard and 
forbearance in politics.) And third, unless we do make that TCE assumption, the analysis of inter-
branch relations collapses. In other words, unless we assume that some political organizations are 
indeed corporate actors (Scharpf 1997: 54), we cannot perform inter-branch analysis (whether with or 
without committees).  
But are all legislative and bureaucratic actors truly corporate? Is there inter-national and inter-
temporal variation in this condition? And, if so, what are its causes?20 Preliminary results of a current 
research effort show that many constitutional regimes create incentives that can lead legislators to 
behave in ways that are not compatible with the TCE assumption of forbearance. 
Clearly then, although TCE offers a promising venue for inter-branch relations research, that 
choice is not innocuous. All theoretical options facing inter-branch specialists come with an 
identifiable opportunity cost. Due to its reliance on the assumption that the contract law applicable to 
internal organization disputes is the law of forbearance, TCE is no exception. And yet, TCE seems to 
represent a choice with a lower opportunity cost than other economic theories.  
Any true choice has an opportunity cost, and the same applies to the choice of a theory. Social-
scientific effort should be based on permanent consideration of these opportunity costs. Yet, however 
                                                      
20  This is the topic of a current research effort (in collaboration with Elia Marzal), which looks into constitutional- and 
parliamentary-law incentives for legislators to behave as if the law of forbearance applied.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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well they score on completeness, consistency, and falsifiability, PA, PTA, and ICT do not score well 
enough on relevance.21 By invoking rationality, common knowledge of payoffs, and costless 
bargaining, these theories assume out ex post contracting maladaptations. Such ex post contracting 
issues being one of the main foci both of inter-branch relations studies and of TCE (which scores 
equally well on the other criteria), TCE is the theory to which we should be referring.  
4. Transaction cost politics: the way forward 
Fortunately, inter-branch scholarship has finally discovered TCE. The main reference is the pivotal 
work of David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (1999). Delegating Powers (‘DP’) immediately 
caught professional attention, became an instant classic (Bendor et al. 2001) and easily crossed the 
Atlantic (Pollack 2003, Franchino 2004). But a lot remains to be done, especially in terms of 
theorizing. This section shows that, despite its authors’ intentions, DP does not offer a TCE argument 
(Section 4.1). It then explicates the minimal set of elements required for a (falsifiable) TCE analysis of 
delegation and its effects (Section 4.2).  
4.1. The unfulfilled promise of Delegating Powers (‘DP’) 
DP is the first work that analyzes the possibility of developing a political theory of transaction costs.
22 
Yet, despite offering one of the best studies in inter-branch relations to date (in my view, ex aequo 
with Huber & Shipan 2002 and Weingast & Moran 1983), it falls short of its own target.  
-A brief presentation of the argument in DP  
The central puzzle addressed in DP is the delegation of powers from Congress to the executive, and in 
particular the variation of the level of delegated authority over time and across issue areas. This is an 
important topic, because it reflects the ‘inherent tension between effectiveness and responsiveness’ in 
US policy-making. ‘In many ways, the history of American political development from 1789 to the 
present can be viewed as an attempt to arrive at a manageable arrangement that allows government to 
be effective yet responsive.’ (5) In that context, responsiveness is enhanced when policy-making rests 
with Congress, and effectiveness when it rests with the executive. 
The existence of the effectiveness-responsiveness trade-off explains the adoption of a TCE 
perspective: ‘policy can be made in Congress, through delegation of authority to executive agencies, 
or by some mixture of these two. … Thus, Congress’ decision to delegate is similar to a firm’s make-
or-buy decision; hence our usage of the term ‘transaction cost politics’.’ (7) In-house production has 
three drawbacks: (a) the cost of acquiring technical expertise; (b) constitutional veto points; and (c) 
‘legislative logrolls [that] tend to inflate the costs of even the simplest policy initiatives.’ (7-8)
23 But 
                                                      
21  In addition, PA being an essentially normative theory, it scores badly on falsifiability. 
22  See also the contemporaneous paper by Huber & Shipan 2000. That paper is not reviewed here, because it is openly 
based on non-TCE assumptions: actors are seen as (a) cognitively rational, (b) maximizing, but (c) informationally 
bounded (26-7). Contrast this with TCE theory, where ‘Bounded rationality … is the cognitive assumption.’ (Williamson 
2002: 440, my emphasis; see also Williamson 1985: 44-6, and Coase 1984: 231) In addition, Huber & Shipan confuse 
TCE and PA (2000: 27-8).  
23  DP does not specify how these fixed parameters produce the alleged differential effects. Note, for example, that if 
logrolls are one of the foremost obstacles to in-house production, and if they are always present no matter the policy area, 
then we should not expect that factor to matter in terms of variation of delegation (a constant cannot explain a variable). 
A counter-argument could be that the absolute size of logrolls matters, and that this does vary. Yet, this would have far-
reaching implications, which are not discussed in DP. Similarly, since constitutional rules and veto points are relatively Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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delegation is not optimal either: (d) bureaucrats may pursue their own policy goals; (e) they may seek 
to inflate their budgets; and (c) they may seek to increase their scope of control. (Again, there is no 
explication of cross-policy variance.)  
The general predictions of DP are straightforward: ‘Our theory predicts, then, that policy will be 
made in the politically most efficient manner, be it through direct legislative action, through 
delegation to executive branch agencies, or through some combination of these two. Note the term 
‘politically’ efficient; we make no claim that policy making under separate powers will be technically 
or economically efficient, allocating resources to their greatest advantage. … Rather, we claim that 
policy will be made in such a way as to maximize legislators’ political goals, which we take to be 
reelection first and foremost.’ (9)
24  
After (a) offering a literature review of PA models of delegation and control; (b) differentiating its 
own argument on delegation from three classic arguments (delegation for reasons of constituency 
relations, delegation as a regulatory lottery, and delegation as blame-shifting), and (c) presenting the 
economic theory of TCE and its adaptation to political science, DP turns to a game-theoretic analysis 
of the decision to delegate. Three general propositions are developed:  
1)  The closer the preferences of the committee to those of the median floor voter, the less likely 
Congress is to delegate authority to the executive. 
2)  The closer the preferences of the president to those of the median floor voter, the more likely 
Congress is to delegate authority to the executive. And 
3)  The more uncertainty associated with a policy area, the more likely Congress is to delegate 
authority to the executive.  
Those propositions lead to nine hypotheses, most of which are derived from the combination of 
institutional and preference-proximity factors. The non-institutional hypothesis (Hypothesis 8) is 
particularly intriguing, due to the difficulty in testing it: ‘More authority will be delegated to the 
executive in informationally intense issue areas.’ (85) Since there is no easy definition of 
informational intensity and policy uncertainty, ‘We take several of these classifications and examine if 
any natural pattern emerges regarding informational intensity and delegation.’ (id.) 
Turning to the empirical analysis, DP makes an impressive use of rich empirical data to which the 
authors were able to gain access. In terms of findings, the regression analyses support all the general 
propositions, and all the specific hypotheses. Given the wealth of data, one additional and informative 
test could have been made on whether legislators who knew they would not be running for re-election 
(due to old age, other office, etc) voted for delegation in the same way as the campaigning army of 
Pontius Pilates. That was not done—but enough was done to make DP an instant classic. Nevertheless, 
one question remains: does DP offer a true TCE approach?  
(Contd.)                                                                   
fixed, we should not be expecting much variation of the dependent variable. And yet, there is a ‘considerable amount of 
variation.’ (5) 
24 Note here that the bounded rationality assumption of TCE may be progressively yielding to a rationalistic calculus 
approach, whereby legislators take advantage of the constitutional regime (separation of powers) in order to fool voters 
and thus secure their re-election. This is exactly equivalent to Weingast’s PA assumption: ‘If creating too many 
agencies implied that congressmen lost control over the policy decisions valuable for reelection, then they 
would not do so.’ (1984: 154.) To the extent that this rationalistic version of TCE and PA are (a) based on the 
same rationality assumption, and (b) lead to the same hypothesis, DP might have needed to explain that in 
greater detailed. 
Trouble seems here to stay if one considers the asymmetrical distribution of the rationality assumption 
(legislators can fool voters, but voters cannot respond by establishing corresponding performance standards). 
Epstein & O’Halloran deny that is the case (32-3). But, insofar as legislators do not opt for technical or 
economic efficiency, voters are systematically fooled, and hence the argument becomes inconsistent. Yannis Karagiannis 
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-Seven main problems with the argument in DP 
The missing concept of integration: The most important problem with the argument in DP relates to 
the unspecified relation between the concept of in-house production and that of integration. In TCE, 
the dependent variable is allowed to take values that cover the whole range of a continuum defined, at 
one extreme, by spot market-like transactions, and, at the other extreme, by fully-fledged integration. 
In DP, by contrast, the dependent variable oscillates in a narrower continuum, which ranges from in-
house production to external procurement, i.e. from congressional policy-making to delegation to the 
best external supplier of services. Since in-house production does not imply integration (i.e. there is 
not merger with an initially autonomous organization), the variation of the dependent variable is 
obviously not the same. DP truncates the variation of the dependent variable, excluding the value that 
is most crucial in TCE, i.e. integration. (Note that DP does acknowledge that delegation comes with 
different degrees of autonomy, where lower degrees of autonomy might be construed as partial 
mergers. Yet, that is not the case: autonomy is construed as inversely related to control instruments 
that apply to inter-firm relations, not to a merged entity.) 
The missing concept of organization: DP focuses on the median floor voter and her lonely struggle 
to increase her re-election probabilities; it therefore describes a world of institutionally constrained 
choice, not a world of institution-building contract. Indeed, DP is based on the view that everything is 
decided by a median floor voter with fixed boundaries. First, the median voter decides everything: 
‘After receiving the committee’s bill, the median floor voter, F, makes the key decision as to whether 
policy will be made through Congress alone or if substantive discretionary authority will be delegated 
to executive branch agencies as well.’ (57) This differentiates DP from TCE and its strong emphasis 
on cooperation and ‘private ordering efforts to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and better 
realize the mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange.’ (Williamson 2002: 440, calling this the 
‘overarching argument’ of TCE.) Second, the actors in DP have fixed boundaries (see also the first 
objection to DP). Indeed, DP construes the committee, the agency, and the presidency as fixed and 
passive actors who only matter by virtue of their identity and the market signals that this sends. (For 
example, the model assumes out the possibility of agency entrepreneurship: 57 n.5.) The median floor 
voter does not engage in bi- or multi-lateral cooperation ‘of a conscious, deliberate, purposeful kind.’ 
(Williamson 2002: 441). Rather, she buys the best offer that is made available to her in the market. So, 
DP depicts a world of autonomous adaptation, and of response to varying relative prices—not to 
varying transaction costs and contractual (i.e. endogenous) dependencies. 
The missing concept of asset specificity: DP focuses on the choice of the median floor voter 
between different suppliers of policy services (the committee, the Chief executive, or the independent 
agency
25), none of which is in the possession of specific assets that are indispensable to the median 
floor voter. In TCE, the main problem consists in the quasi-rents that can be extracted by one party in 
a bilateral relationship, when the other party has made relationship-specific investments and therefore 
has no credible option outside that relationship. In other words, TCE analysis considers what happens 
after the ‘fundamental transformation’, i.e. when asset specificity makes the relationship change from 
a ‘large numbers’ bidding situation to a ‘small numbers’ bargaining situation (Williamson 1985: 
chapters 2 and 4). In DP, by contrast, the median floor voter chooses to delegate to (or take back 
powers from) any of at least three agents, none of which has any relationship-specific degree of 
monopoly power. Thus, the median floor voter can choose her preferred partner, knowing that the 
selected partner faces competition by the other two potential partners. In that context, the fact that the 
chosen partner may not be able to offer credible commitments regarding a specific policy course 
should not raise worries of hold-ups, since potential competition creates high-powered incentives.  
                                                      
25  In fact, DP seems to consider several possible agents: independent agencies (which may or may not include independent 
commissions), the executive office of the president, a government corporation, and ‘one or more committees’ (46). Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/04 © 2007 Yannis Karagiannis  21 
Trust your friends or trust them not? The central hypotheses in DP are all based on the intuition 
that legislators prefer delegating to non-enemies than to enemies (they choose to delegate to the actor 
whose preferences are closer to them). The idea is that the median floor voter in the legislature will 
delegate powers to political actors who have identical, similar, or at least non-conflicting preferences 
with her own preferences, because that way she minimizes the chances of being held up. As should be 
obvious from the previous point, that is quite at odds with TCE’s ‘Voltairian’ view. (We attribute to 
Voltaire the phrase ‘May God defend me from my friends; I can defend myself from my enemies.’
26) In 
TCE, what matters most is the small numbers problem and the issue of relationship-specific 
investments in an opportunistic world. It is the combination of these factors that leads to the problem 
of hold-up and quasi-rents. And, in turn, that explains specific governance structures and, ultimately, 
integration. DP depicts a different world, where relationship-specific investments are secured by 
promise and initial preference homogeneity (friendship).
27 Further, the median floor voter faces a 
choice between different organizations to which she can delegate powers. Clearly, then, she lives in a 
competitive environment, and this should normally be enough to dissipate her worries about future 
hold-ups. The description of such a world, however elegant, mathematically- and statistically-loaded it 
may be, is both trivial (in the sense that it does not need to be based on inferential techniques) and far 
removed from TCE. 
The ambiguous behavioural assumption: DP claims that transaction costs ‘would seem to have 
relevance for any system characterized by a series of agreements between rational, utility-maximizing 
individuals.’ (43) Nevertheless, it also acknowledges that one of the four crucial assumptions of TCE 
is bounded rationality, and that this inevitably leads to incomplete contracts. (45-7) But then, some 
confusion creeps in, and complete contracts seem to be feasible: ‘Legislators can … write detailed 
laws, in which case the executive branch will have little or no substantive input into policy…’ (47) 
And ‘When legislators make all important policy decisions themselves, which is equivalent to 
congressional policy making, agencies have no discretion. When laws leave the details of public 
policy to the executive to fill in, then agencies have greater discretion. And it is Congress that chooses 
a point along this continuum by writing detailed or broad legislation.’ (51) Inasmuch as this means 
that, in principle, a contract between the legislature and the executive can be complete (i.e. leave ‘no 
discretion’), it is a far cry from the TCE assumption of necessarily incomplete contracts ... which DP 
also makes (e.g. ‘the presence of incomplete contracts implies that Congress cannot specify the details 
of all future agency actions…’ at 48)
28 
The missing historical horizon: DP starts on the assumption that the median floor voter can choose 
any ‘agent’ she wants, without regard to past relationships; similarly, it does not analyse what happens 
at the ex post contracting stage. Although it is argued that ‘the model … captures the key elements of 
policy making under separate powers and produces testable predictions’ (52-3), there is actually very 
little in terms of actual policy-making issues. On the contrary, DP is self-confessedly limited to ‘a 
formal model of Congress’ decision to delegate’ (53), where the ‘model is one of sequential signalling 
and screening’ (57). The median floor voter does not learn from the past, and she disappears in the 
future. The issue of adaptation at the ex post contracting stage (i.e. the central observable implication 
                                                      
26  Apparently, Bertolt Brecht wrote something similar: ‘I don’t trust him. We’re friends.’ (Quoted in D. Carlton & J. 
Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley 2000: 396)  
27  Note a further inconsistency in DP: decisions are made by the median floor voter, whose rule of thumb is partisan 
identity. But, her own party affiliation is not an issue (otherwise, DP would be based on legislative majorities). In one 
case party matters, and in the other it does not. 
28  Note also in that respect that, while legislators behave in a strongly rational way, the electorate seems to be systematically 
fooled by the separation of powers trick. DP argues that this is not the case, since the electorate should be rational (32-3). 
But, if the electorate is rational (i.e. if delegation does not allow legislators to wash their hands and thereby secure 
electoral impunity despite being the ones responsible for delegation, monitoring, and organizational design) then what are 
the electoral benefits of delegation? Will not the electorate duly punish those who delegate in order to spare time for 
symbolic hand-shakes? All in all, there is an inconsistent assumption regarding the actors’ cognitive condition.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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that differentiates TCE from PA and ICT) is never mentioned in the whole book.
29 Thus, the 
‘transaction costs’ of DP are those involved in a least-costly separating equilibrium game where the 
main problem is adverse selection—not those of TCE theory. Contrast this with the view that 
‘Transaction cost economics maintains that it is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant 
bargaining action at the ex ante contracting stage. Instead, bargaining is pervasive—on which 
account the institutions of private ordering and the study of contracting in its entirety take on critical 
economic significance.’ (Williamson 1985: 29) 
The Grand Betrayal:
30 DP does not take TCE to its logical conclusions, because at its core lies a 
ICT assumption that is incompatible with TCE. DP assumes that organization is inefficient, and that 
the political-market procurement creates PA-like problems: ‘There are political transaction costs 
associated with either option: the costs of making policy internally come from the inefficiencies of the 
committee system, while the problems of delegation stem mainly from Congress’ principal-agent 
problems of oversight and control, which we describe as a political hold-up problem.’ (49) It is 
obvious, however, that the theoretical informant of this proposition is a hybrid PA/PTA/TCE/ICT 
view. As Epstein & O’Halloran themselves note, ‘The importance of controlling the physical assets 
involved in production is the keystone of the property rights approach to vertical integration. In fact, 
this is the principal advantage of the property rights paradigm, as traditional transaction cost 
approaches [sic!] have difficulty explaining exactly why mergers can solve the hold-up problem.’ (42) 
It should now be obvious that this view is internally inconsistent (see Section 3). Suffice it to note 
Williamson’s view on the property rights approach: ‘it makes strange predictions (in that integration 
does not imply the unified ownership and management of two stages, A and B, but instead integration 
is ‘directional’: it matters whether A acquires B or B acquires A because unified [coordinated] 
decision-making is not attempted) and is very nearly untestable.’ (2002: 442) Thus, however fancy the 
statistical regressions in DP may be, and however significant the resulting coefficients, much of it may 
be futile. Given our current knowledge, there is no way we can meaningfully interpret the results of 
such an internally inconsistent model.  
4.2. Minimum set of elements for a political TCE analysis 
First, the behavioural assumption is universal bounded rationality. Inter-branch studies usually focus 
on the relation between legislators and the executive (however defined). It follows that those two 
organizational actors (and any identifiable organizational actors therein) must be assumed to be 
boundedly rational. In addition, for reasons pertaining to consistency and completeness, and because a 
lot of inter-branch politics depends on the capabilities of the ultimate dispute resolution mechanism, 
this assumption must also apply to courts. Note that bounded rationality means that all actors are 
intendedly rational, but only limitedly so: ‘the rational spirit approach is not coterminous with 
hyperrationality.’ (Williamson 1996: 8) This assumption serves to differentiate a TCE approach from 
PA and PTA ones. Note also that it is logically possible to postulate that boundedly rational actors are 
fully rational about the existence of future problems, but boundedly rational about the specific nature 
and timing of those problems.  
Second, because of bounded rationality, contracts are inevitably incomplete. Unlike in DP, 
contractual incompleteness is not only due to staff and other resource limitations that supposedly 
distinguish legislatures from business firms. On the contrary, contractual incompleteness is also due to 
the prevalence of bounded rationality and to the radically uncertain character of the world in which we 
live. So, complete contracting is impossible in principle, not only in practice. (The concept comes 
                                                      
29  Of course, one could argue that DP operates on the basis of a Cartesian division of political-scientific work, and that its 
focus on delegation is part of a larger story. (In more technical terms, the game-theoretical model may be understood as a 
reduced form presentation of a more complex model that does not yet exist.) But, as the other points show, that is not the 
case. 
30  I use the phrase ‘The Grand Betrayal’ to paraphrase Epstein & O’Halloran’s ‘The Grand Regression’ (233-36).  Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/04 © 2007 Yannis Karagiannis  23 
from economics, which proves that exceptionalist arguments about the nature of political 
organizations, such as in DP, fail.) Crucial in that respect is the fact that the analysis must not be 
limited to the contracting stage: the main part of TCE consists in investigating patterns of ex post 
contracting cooperation, as misalignments between means and goals gradually appear.  
Third, promise is not self-enforcing. This assumption is due to bounded rationality, but also, and 
mainly, to the second behavioural assumption: opportunism. Opportunism means that politics (like 
business) is a rather bleak world, where commitment is problematic. In that world, no one is safe by 
virtue of gentlemanly agreements, partisan affiliation, or ideological congruence. Progress (i.e. 
exchange) can only be achieved by devising appropriate safeguards. Thus, opportunism leads to 
organization. ‘Organization’ refers to conscious, deliberate, and purposeful cooperation, if necessary 
with exchanges of hostages (Williamson 1996: 120-44), and, if that is still not enough, with mergers. 
Organization must thus be distinguished from spontaneous/autonomous adaptation to changes in 
relative political prices. Hence, it includes constitutions and institutions, of course, but also, and 
mainly, governance structures.  
Fourth, TCE is a second-order economizing theory (Williamson 2000). It focuses on rules which 
are constrained by two higher levels of rules. The highest level consists of socially embedded rules 
(i.e. secular macro-level customs, traditions, etc). Given their secular character and their spontaneous 
appearance, these rules are not economizing ones.31 The second level consists of formal rules of the 
game (i.e. the constitutional and institutional environment, which is slightly less fixed). Here, 
opportunities for purposeful action may arise: that is the level of first-order economizing. The third 
level consists of governance structures and quasi-continuous re-alignments to match such structures 
with the transactions that they support. That is where TCE operates: the main dependent variable is 
governance structures. Finally, a fourth level consists of permanent resource allocation and 
employment relations, where third-order economizing occurs (and where PA or PTA are the most 
suitable options, provided that they are not exported by the analyst to higher levels of rules).  
Fifth, TCE may be applicable to first-order economizing rules, but only if it can be shown that 
design opportunities at that level are more important than macro-level evolutionary processes. In other 
words, a big difference between economics and political science is that political actors are more 
focused on such rules than business firms are. It follows that political scientists may assume that 
adaptive economizing occurs at the level of formal rules of the game. But, again, not all political 
environments exhibit a predominantly economizing character at that level. For example, there is a big 
difference between the longevity of the US Constitution and the unstable quasi-federal constitutions of 
Spain, the UK, or the European Union. 
Sixth, the dependent variable (i.e. governance structures, unless the conditions in the previous point 
apply, in which case it also includes institutions) must be allowed to vary without assuming that some 
values signify inefficiency. In that respect, note first that in-house production must not be considered 
as the maximum potential value, which should then be compared with market transactions (i.e. ‘lower’ 
values of the dependent variable). On the contrary, careful consideration must be given to the political 
equivalents of the economic concepts of integration (mergers). Note second that, unlike in DP, where 
the assumption is that internal organization implies inefficiencies, a TCE view must be based on the 
assumption that such inefficiencies become comparatively expensive only when ‘asset specificity is 
insubstantial.’ (Williamson 1985: 132) More generally, the issue of asset specificity (i.e. relationship-
specific investments) is probably the single most important departing point for the advancement of 
falsifiable TCE hypotheses.  
                                                      
31  Herein lies the main problem of voluntaristic political analyses, which assume that there can be first-order economizing 
at the level of embedded rules. The exemplar is the neo-functionalist conjecture on European integration, which assumed 
ever since the late 1950s that the sunny weather of Messina was a good test of rainwear for Brussels and the Ruhr 
industrial heartland.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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Finally, ‘operationalization entails naming and explicating the critical dimensions with respect to 
which transactions differ, naming and explicating the critical attributes with respect to which 
governance structures differ, and working out the logic of efficient alignment. The general argument is 
this: more complex forms of governance are reserved for more hazardous transactions.’ (Williamson 
2002: 441) Two points need to be clarified here: 
a)  First, TCE in a contractarian theory that focuses on governance structures—not on the nominal 
identity of potential co-operators. Actors are not looking for friends, but for credible 
commitments. In times of trouble, exchange of hostages, or even integration, with an enemy is 
safer than the promise of a friend.  
b)  Second, the most critical dimensions with respect to which transactions differ do not necessarily 
relate to the nature of the final product. Rather, there is a more general logical category that 
applies first, that of strong bilateral inter-dependence (i.e. asset specificity).  
5. Conclusion 
Of course, these elements are only the starting point of a political theory of TCE. As things stand 
today, a political scientist who contemplates using TCE must also decide on the following more ‘open-
ended’ questions: 
1)  How much can/should governance structures and/or institutions be assumed to be functional; and 
conversely, how much can/should they be assumed to reflect power politics? (On that issue, see 
Elster 1989: 71-81 and 99, Moe 1990, Fiorina 1990). Note here that TCE is explicitly located on 
the ‘efficiency branch of contract’ (Williamson 1985: 26-9), and therefore that it is an essentially 
functional theory. The central explanation is derived from exchange, transactions cost-
economizing, and mutuality of advantage, and not from power and power politics. On the one 
hand, TCE acknowledges that even functional solutions have an opportunity cost, which is 
measured in terms of production cost-economizing. A political TCE theory should aim at 
quantifying this opportunity cost in relative (i.e. comparative) terms. 
2)  What is the exact balance between, on the one hand, the ‘rationality’ component, and, on the other 
hand, the ‘bounded’ component of the notion of ‘bounded rationality’? Although the assumption 
of bounded rationality is a sine qua non condition for TCE analysis, the analyst has to decide how 
much forward-looking actors can factor future hazards back into the initial contract. That decision 
will have a crucial effect on the choice of the analytic technique: if the analyst assumes that actors 
can meaningfully screen current and future types of partners, then game theory might be 
applicable (at least up to the point that it does not produce results that contradict the social 
embeddedness of certain values, and thus the non-economizing nature of certain institutions); if, 
on the other hand, the analyst believes that the actors cannot meaningfully analyze and/or predict 
the identity of current and future partners, then non-evolutionary game theory will not suffice, and 
may even damage the quality of the analysis by introducing some inconsistent elements of 
hyper-rationality.  
3)  Which actors can be assumed to be corporate actors, and which should be treated as collective 
actors? As shown above, in their seminal contribution, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) make the 
assumption that every legislator will vote, and that voting will clear the political market. That 
implies that neither Congress as a whole, nor congressional parties, are corporate actors—which 
may be a reasonable assumption for the American political system, but not for other systems. On 
the other hand, TCE is based on the assumption that actors within an organization engage in 
sustained co-operation and permanent bargaining, and thus that they do not often resort to such 
radical measures (see also Elster 1989: 74: n.4, and Shepsle 2006 34). It follows that the analyst 
must carefully define the attributes of each organizational actor, most evidently by reference to the 
notion of forbearance.  Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations 
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Having explicated her answers to those questions, the analyst has to choose what to compare. As 
already mentioned in the text, the dependent variable of a TCE analysis measures the degree of 
integration between two or more contracting parties. The values of the dependent variable range from 
spot market-like transactions, to fully-fledged integration, with quasi-market transactions, and strong 
governance structures lying within that continuum. But, what causes a variation of the dependent 
variable? Again, as mentioned in the text, the key independent variables identified by TCE measure 
(a) the searching costs of using the market mechanism, and (b) the hazardous character of 
transactions.
32 It is the combination of these two variables that leads to particular values of the 
dependent variable. But one question remains: where should we look for comparisons? In other words, 
how should we identify cases of variation of the independent variables?  
There are three possible answers. The first answer consists in comparing different policies, in the 
hope that policies differ in an essential and systematic way, so that ‘policies determine politics’ (Lowi 
1972: 299), and so that politics determines transaction costs (as in DP). The second answer consists in 
comparing the same policy across nations, in the hope that institutions determine transaction costs 
(e.g. Huber & Shipan 2002). And finally, the third answer consists in comparing the same policy in the 
same national setting, but across different periods of time, in the hope that these periods correspond to 
different levels of transaction costs. Clearly, each option has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Given the current stage of development of political TCE, it may be premature to argue strongly for one 
comparative approach and against the other two. Nevertheless, any TCE analysis must explicate the 
choice made between these options. 
Clearly, then, TCE is neither a theory that readily translates into political science, nor a theoretical 
choice that can be consciously made without acknowledging its own opportunity costs. On the 
contrary, lots of translating work remains to be done, and some important uncertainties persist. Where 
we can be certain, however, is that (a) by virtue of its relevance to the questions of delegation, 
discretion, and control, TCE offers a promising basis on which to continue political-scientific research 
in inter-branch relations, (b) the theory is consistent, complete, and falsifiable, and more so than other 
economic theories on which inter-branch relations research has been based, and (c) these qualities 
would be lost if we decided to confuse TCE with neighbouring but plainly different theories, such as 
PA, PTA, and ICT.  
                                                      
32  As mentioned repeatedly in the text, according to Williamson (1983) and Joskow (1985), the main issue here should be 
the degree to which a transaction leads to relationship-specific sunk investments.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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